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10	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT		
11	EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA		
12			
13	PLANS, Inc.,  Case No. CIV. S-98-0266 FCD PAN		
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15	Plaintiffs, Date: April 1, 2005 Time: 10:00 a.m. v. Place: Courtroom 2		
16	SACRAMENTO CITY UNIFIED SCHOOL ) MOTION IN LIMINE NO. THIRTEEN		
17	DISTRICT, TWIN RIDGES ELEMENTARY ) SCHOOL DISTRICT, DOES 1-100, DEFENDANTS' JOINT MOTION IN		
18	) LIMINE TO EXCLUDE EXPERTS NOT		
19	Defendants. ) PROPERLY DISCLOSED BY PLAINTIFF		
20	I. INTRODUCTION.		
21	Defendants TWIN RIDGES ELEMENTARY SCHOOL DISTRICT (hereafter "TRESD") and		
22	SACRAMENTO CITY UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT (hereafter collectively "Districts" or		
23	"Defendants") move this Court, in limine, for an order excluding any testimony by "expert" witnesses		
24	not disclosed pursuant to the Court's Scheduling Order of March 10, 2004.		
25	II. ARGUMENT.		
26	The Court's Scheduling Order of March 10, 2004, required that the parties designate in writing		
27	expert witnesses they propose to tender at trial no later than April 16, 2004. The Order also provided		
28	twenty (20) days for supplemental designation of experts. (See Court's Scheduling Order at 3.) The		

Order specifically states that "An expert witness not appearing on a party's written expert designation will not be permitted to testify unless the party offering the witness demonstrates: (a) that the necessity for the witness could not have been reasonably anticipated at the time the list was proffered; (b) that the court and opposing counsel were promptly notified upon discovery of the witness; and (c) that the witness was promptly made available for deposition." (*See* Court's Scheduling Order at 3.)

In *Wong v. Regents of the University of Cal.*, 379 F.3d 1097 (9th Cir. 2004), a case in which the court's scheduling order at issue identified the same three bases for allowing the belatedly disclosed expert to testify (*see id.* at 1103)—the Ninth Circuit upheld the district court's denial of a plaintiff's request to make a supplemental, i.e., untimely, disclosure of expert witnesses under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, rules 16 and 37(c). Under Rule 16, the court explained:

The abuse of discretion standard is deferential, and properly so, since the district court needs the authority to manage the cases before it efficiently and effectively. In these days of heavy caseloads, trial courts in both federal and state systems routinely set schedules and establish deadlines to foster the efficient treatment and resolution of cases. Those efforts will be successful only if the deadlines are taken seriously by the parties, and the best way to encourage that is to enforce the deadlines. Parties must understand that they will pay a price for failure to comply strictly with scheduling and other orders, and that failure to do so may properly support severe sanctions and exclusions of evidence. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure explicitly authorize the establishment of schedules and deadlines, in Rule 16(b), and the enforcement of those schedules by the imposition of sanctions, in Rule 16(f)." *Id.* at 1103.

The same scheduling considerations apply in this case. Experts were required to be disclosed in April 2004, and Plaintiff first listed these "experts" in January 2005.

Under Rule 37(c), as another ground for its decision denying the plaintiff's request to add expert witnesses after the disclosure deadline, the *Wong* decision upheld the district court's conclusion that the single factor (a)—that the necessity for such a witness could have been reasonably anticipated at the time the lists were exchanged—was alone sufficient to exclude the testimony of the supplemental expert witnesses even though the other two criteria, (b) and (c), were "likely satisfied." *Id.* There was no substantial justification for belated disclosure; and the untimely disclosure also was not "harmless."

If Wong had been permitted to disregard the deadline for identifying expert witnesses, the rest of the schedule laid out by the court months in advance, and understood by the parties, would have to have been altered as well. Disruption to the schedule of the court and other parties

in that manner is not harmless. Courts set such schedules to permit the court and the parties to deal with cases in a thorough and orderly manner, and they must be allowed to enforce them, unless there are good reasons not to. The district court did not abuse its discretion here in refusing to permit Wong to supplement his disclosure with the additional expert witnesses and in barring testimony by and relying upon those witnesses. *Id.* at 1105.

The same grounds (Rules 16 and 37(c)) and the same rationale apply to an even greater extent in this case.

Plaintiff failed to serve any expert designation prior to the April 16, 2004, deadline. (*See* Pretrial Conference Order dated February 18, 2005 at 13.) Plaintiff also failed to serve a supplemental designation after Defendants disclosed experts on April 16, 2004. Yet, Plaintiff now includes four experts which he lists as "Defendants' Expert" (Plaintiff's Witness List, Nos 1-4)¹ as well as a whole host of people who will purportedly testify either as "percipient" or "foundational" witnesses on the subjects of Waldorf education and/or anthroposophy. (Plaintiff's Witness List Nos. 8, 22-29 and 31-34.) This is clearly Plaintiff's attempt at an end run around the expert disclosure requirement.

Plaintiff should not be allowed to call these witnesses at trial. These witnesses were not previously disclosed as expert witnesses by Plaintiff. Districts have not had the opportunity to depose these witnesses. Plaintiff did not notify counsel or the court of any new expert witnesses. Furthermore, Plaintiff has provided no information as to why it could not have disclosed the experts within the time frame allowed. For all of these reasons, Plaintiff should not be allowed to call these witnesses at the trial. To allow Plaintiff to do so would allow Plaintiff to ignore the strict guidelines of the Court's Scheduling Order and to thwart normal discovery rules.

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> TRESD's objection to Plaintiff's listing of these four witnesses is also contained in TRESD's Objections to Final Pretrial Conference Order to be filed with the court on or before March 14, 2005.

1	III. CONCLUSION.		
2	For the foregoing reasons, Defendants respectfully request that this Court grant this motion in		
3	limine excluding testimony by Plaintiff's witnesses numbers 1-4, 8, 22-29 and 31-34 on Exhibit C to		
4	the Pretrial Conference Order.		
5		Respectfully submitted,	
6		GIRARD & VINSON, LLP	
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9	DATED: March 11, 2005.	By /s/ Michelle L. Cannon MICHELLE L. CANNON	
10		Attorneys for TWIN RIDGES ELEMENTARY SCHOOL DISTRICT	
11		DISTRICT	
12		KRONICK MOSKOVITZ TIEDEMANN & GIRARD	
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14			
15	DATED: March 11, 2005.	By /s/ Susan R. Denious as authorized on 3/10/05 SUSAN R. DENIOUS	
16		Attorneys for SACRAMENTO CITY UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT	
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